In essay two, I study top executive compensation and CEO turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China, using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the controlling shareholder's ownership is high. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name. In conclusion, the association between the listed subsidiary and its parent company may affect the pay-for-performance sensitivity to a parent company. / Keywords: Communist Party of China (CPC), party secretary, performance; management compensation, business group, China / My dissertation includes two essays. In essay one, I investigate the party control in China's listed firms. Along with state shareholding and government administration, the third source of political control of Chinese listed firms is the Communist Party of China (CPC). Using a unique hand-collected dataset that includes the party secretaries' information for listed firms between 2000 and 2004, I examine the existence and power of the party secretaries in companies and their influence on performance. The party secretary is the leader of party committee and exercises the power of the CPC at firm-level. Power is assessed by whether the party secretary concurrently holds another key management position, such as chairman or CEO, thus allowing him or her to exert influence on the managerial decisions of the firm. I find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with many employees are more likely to have a party secretary or a powerful party secretary than are other firms. Party secretaries are more likely to have political reliability but less professionalism than are CEOs or other senior managers. The existence of a party secretary is negatively associated with a firm's performance, but only in SOEs. Non-state firms with a party secretary are more likely to have senior managers with political connections, but less professionalism, but I find no such significant results for SOEs. The firms with a party secretary or a powerful party secretary have lower labor productivity than do other firms, especially in SOEs and in regions with high unemployment rates. Overall, the results of this study suggest that the CPC has great influence over listed firms in China and that this influence should not be neglected in Chinese studies. / Yu, Wei. / Adviser: P. H. Joseph Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0239. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-88). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_344391 |
| Date | January 2009 |
| Contributors | Yu, Wei, Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Accountancy. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, theses |
| Format | electronic resource, microform, microfiche, 1 online resource (viii, 103 leaves : ill.) |
| Coverage | China, China, China |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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