Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Economic Studies MASTER THESIS An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels Author: Bc. Jindřich Matoušek Supervisor: PhDr. Lubomír Cingl Academic Year: 2013/2014 Abstract The multi-unit auction mechanisms are one of the most important instruments used for the allocation of spectrum licenses, airport time slots, delivery routes, networking or furniture allocation. This thesis experimentally examines the attributes of complex multi-unit auction mechanisms (Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction and its combinatorial extension Simultaneous Multi-Round Package Bidding) in the presence of an opportunity to collude among the bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel - a chat window. The results suggest that in our parameter setting, the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Interestingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages probably makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:333264 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Matoušek, Jindřich |
| Contributors | Cingl, Lubomír, Kukačka, Jiří |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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