An analysis of unanticipated cost growth (cost overruns) in the construction of electric powerplants, focusing on those characteristics within the firm's operating environment which distort incentives for efficient resource allocation. The work of Averch-Johnson and Joskow serves as a starting point for a theoretical analysis which specifies the firm's objective function as it appears within the context of modern electric utility regulation. The author concludes that the objective function as specified implies that the willingness of the firm to invest is fully determined by three factors: expected plant life for rate making purposes, the allowed return on ratebase, and the firm's opportunity cost of capital. Two data sets are used to test the derived hypotheses. One is Department of Energy data on all nuclear generating units currently in service in the United States. The second is a data set compiled by the author from the docket files of the Florida Public Service Commission covering all powerplants currently in service in the Jacksonville Electric Authority, Gulf Power Company, Florida Power Corporation and Florida Power and Light Company service areas. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 44-07, Section: A, page: 2207. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1983.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_75140 |
Contributors | FARNEY, KEMM C., Florida State University |
Source Sets | Florida State University |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Text |
Format | 84 p. |
Rights | On campus use only. |
Relation | Dissertation Abstracts International |
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