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Addressing the Need for Recognition: A Fundamental and Constitutive Point of Departure for Catholic Social Ethics

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan, SJ / Why should any society acknowledge and address recognition as a vital human need? This dissertation primarily sets out to offer a theological ethical response to this opportune and critical question. Fundamentally, it does not attempt to develop a new theory of recognition or, even, correct the existing ones. Rather, in agreement with the Aristotelian eudemonistic principle that the end of ethics is virtuous action and drawing on major theories of recognition, it highlights the necessity of acting virtuously in a manner that properly addresses the human need for due recognition. Its ultimate goal is to highlight the ethical significance of recognition as a vital human need. This goal is premised on the central thesis that all human beings need to be duly recognized and consistently treated as subjects with inherent dignity and fundamental rights; and, that failure to address the need for recognition leads to a catch-22 situation in human society. Therefore, it argues that doing a proper social ethics, especially Catholic Social Ethics, practically demands that we duly address the human need for recognition and explore how to integrate the habit of mutual recognition into the moral schemas of our societies so as to create a thriving culture of recognition – one that normalizes, prioritizes, and sustains mutual recognition as a common ground for negotiating the common good in modern multicultural and pluralistic societies. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:BOSTON/oai:dlib.bc.edu:bc-ir_109764
Date January 2023
CreatorsNwainya, Hilary Ogonna
PublisherBoston College
Source SetsBoston College
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, thesis
Formatelectronic, application/pdf
RightsCopyright is held by the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0).

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