A cryptographic security architecture constitutes the collection of hardware and software which protects and controls the use of encryption keys and similar cryptovariables. This thesis presents a design for a portable, flexible high-security architecture based on a traditional computer security model. Behind the API it consists of a kernel implementing a reference monitor which controls access to security-relevant objects and attributes based on a configurable security policy. Layered over the kernel are various objects which abstract core functionality such as encryption and digital signature capabilities, certificate management and secure sessions and data enveloping (email encryption). The kernel itself uses a novel design which bases its security policy on a collection of filter rules enforcing a cryptographic module-specific security policy. Since the enforcement mechanism (&e kernel) is completely independent of the policy database (the filter rules), it is possible to change the behaviour of the architecture by updating the policy database without having to make any changes to the kernel itself. This clear separation of policy and mechanism contrasts with current cryptographic security architecture approaches which, if they enforce controls at all, hardcode them into the implementation, making it difficult to either change the controls to meet application-specific requirements or to assess and verify them. To provide assurance of the correctness of the implementation, this thesis presents a design and implementation process which has been selected to allow the implementation to be verified in a manner which can reassure an outsider that it does indeed function as required. In addition to producing verification evidence which is understandable to the average user, the verification process for an implementation needs to be fully automated and capable of being taken down to the level of running code, an approach which is currently impossible with traditional methods. The approach presented here makes it possible to perform verification at this level, something which had previously been classed as "beyond Al" (that is, not achievable using any known technology). The versatility of the architecture presented here has been proven through its use in implementations ranging from l6-bit microcontrollers through to supercomputers, as well as a number of unusual areas such as security modules in ATMs and cryptographic coprocessors for general-purpose computers. / Note: Updated version of the thesis now published as Gutmann, P (2004). Cryptographic security architecture: design and verification. New York: Springer. ISBN 9780387953876.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/275153 |
| Date | January 2000 |
| Creators | Gutmann, Peter |
| Publisher | ResearchSpace@Auckland |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated., http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm, Copyright: The author |
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