In the hedonic coalition formation game model Roles Based Hedonic Games (RBHG), agents view teams as compositions of available roles. An agent's utility for a partition is based upon which role she fulfills within the coalition and which additional roles are being fulfilled within the coalition. I consider optimization and stability problems for settings with variable power on the part of the central authority and on the part of the agents. I prove several of these problems to be NP-complete or coNP-complete. I introduce heuristic methods for approximating solutions for a variety of these hard problems. I validate heuristics on real-world data scraped from League of Legends games.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uky.edu/oai:uknowledge.uky.edu:cs_etds-1041 |
| Date | 01 January 2015 |
| Creators | Spradling, Matthew |
| Publisher | UKnowledge |
| Source Sets | University of Kentucky |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Theses and Dissertations--Computer Science |
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