The nonidentity problem is the issue of how to justify the belief that it is wrong to bring a person into existence if they would have a flawed life, though still worth living, instead of bringing another, nonidentical person into existence who would have a better life. To have an impaired life that is worth living seems to be a good existence, at least for the person in question. The nonidentity problem was made known mostly by Derek Parfit. The problem draws attention to three intuitions that seemingly cannot all be correct. How we respond to this predicament and which intuitions a solution depends on have severe implications primarily in population ethics but it will also affect other areas, to mention a few; genetic engineering, if and how to correct historical wrongdoing, and just resource management. In this essay, I will discuss David Boonin’s objections to previously proposed approaches to handle the nonidentity problem and his proposal on a solution. The conclusion I will draw is that although Boonin presents an answer based on a strategy of biting the bullet he fails to show how this is a plausible response to the nonidentity problem. Instead, I argue for my preferred strategy to tackle the problem by referring to a consequentialist moral theory such as utilitarianism. I intend to show that such a theory provides the most plausible solution and make the case that Boonin’s critique of such an approach is unjustified.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-446363 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Lumarker, Artemis |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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