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Getting a fair deal: efficient risk allocation in the private provision of infrastructure

Over the last decade there has been an increasing trend by governments in Australia and throughout the world to use the skills and expertise of the private sector in developing and implementing infrastructure projects. The agreement for these projects must allocate responsibility for dealing with the risks which may arise to either the government directly, or on behalf of consumers, or to the private sponsor. / This thesis investigates risk allocation in the private provision of infrastructure, particularly in build-own-operate (BOO) and build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) projects. Its primary objective is to identify a framework for efficient risk allocation so that decision makers can assess the efficiency of the risk allocation in past projects and can attempt to increase the efficiency of the risk allocation in future projects. / This thesis defines an efficient situation as one where the risk allocation cannot be varied without the total risk premium for the entire project being increased, and approach based on Pareto optimality. As it is almost impossible to determine the true risk premium charged by parties for risk bearing, risks should be allocated to the party best able to control and manage them. This is explained to mean the party which is best able to control or manage the likelihood of the risk occurring or the size of its consequences if it does occur. It also means the party with the best access to reasonable mitigation techniques and the party which is least risk averse. Those exogenous risks which are not easily allocated in this way should be shared so that both parties, the sponsor and the government, have an incentive to manage them. Some of the options for sharing these risks are examined. / The application of the theory of efficient risk allocation is simplified by using a categorical risk framework. This approach is then tested on seven case studies of recent Australian projects spanning several industry sectors. Finally, the theoretical hypotheses and assumptions are tested in a survey of key participants in the Australian private infrastructure industry. This survey not only confirms that the basic theory for efficient risk allocation is valid but also identifies the key areas of concern to the private sector when it considers project risk allocation. Risks of concern are identified and possible options for risk sharing are investigated. / This thesis concludes that it is possible to achieve efficient risk allocations in practice, and that by achieving this outcome transaction costs can be reduced, allowing cheaper infrastructure services to be supplied to the community. However, several hurdles to achieving this outcome are identified. These include the peculiar characteristics of banks and their position in projects funded using non-recourse project finance, and the fact that most private firms fail to value potential upside risks as highly as they fear potential losses due to downside risks. / More work is needed to understand and overcome these hurdles if efficient risk allocation is to be achieved in the real world. It is only then that governments can be sure that they are providing private sector infrastructure services to the community at the lowest overall cost.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/275862
Date January 2000
CreatorsArndt, Raphael Henry
Source SetsAustraliasian Digital Theses Program
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
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