This article explores the corporate governance in the developed countries and China from a comparative perspective. Following the analysis of principal-agent model, this article examines the dispersion-to-concentration ownership span to explore its influence on the majority/minority ownership and the shareholder/manager conflicts. It compares the positive and negative edges of concentrated shareholding with empirical analysis of Canada, the U.S., and China, and finds the different roles of institutional shareholders in various countries. This article then turns to two-tier agency model which is another way to enhance corporate governance. Compared with the vertical construct with the vanguard of Germany, it illustrates that the supervisory board in china is situated parallel to the board of directors and loses the supervising purpose. This article finally explores the independent director system which has obtained credits in the developed countries. While in China, it lacks legal protection and is not effective as expected.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:OTU.1807/25760 |
| Date | 10 January 2011 |
| Creators | Li, Manjiang |
| Contributors | MacIntosh, Jeffrey G. |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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