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Strategic information disclosure when there is fundamental disagreement: an empirical investigation

I empirically investigate the managements’ decision to voluntarily disclose strategic information. While carrying a benefit of reduced information asymmetry, strategic information disclosure carries a cost of investors disagreeing with managements’ strategy and thus refusing to provide funding to the firm. Using a hand- collected sample of information releases, I identify firm characteristics that affect the likelihood of strategic information disclosure. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015 / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:fau.edu/oai:fau.digital.flvc.org:fau_31566
ContributorsVolkov, Nikanor (author), Agapova, Anna (Thesis advisor), Florida Atlantic University (Degree grantor), College of Business, Department of Finance
PublisherFlorida Atlantic University
Source SetsFlorida Atlantic University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation, Text
Format189 p., application/pdf
RightsCopyright © is held by the author, with permission granted to Florida Atlantic University to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder., http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

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