This thesis examines and critiques the American political discourse on the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The event itself is past, yet words used to
describe and explain the missile crisis capture and give meaning to the
experience. The meaning of the crisis begins in a basic sense, then, with the
discourse. The increasing availability of material evidence has reinvigorated
the discourse on the missive crisis. Where relevant, recent evidence will be
employed to critique previous and recent interpretations of the this seminal
event.
Consensus and debate are both to be found in the discourse on the
Cuban crisis. First, there is a large body of shared understanding, or
conventional wisdom, on the crisis. Secondly, there is disagreement as to
the meaning of the crisis in recent manifestations of the discourse. The
essay will use a propaganda model lo examine the politically necessary
mythology embodied in the conventional wisdom. This thesis will use a
tendency analysis approach to organize the debate on the missile crisis,
along the lines of ideological schools of thought, and within the context of a
larger American nuclear debate. The propaganda and the tendency analyse
models complement the general approach of discourse. These models have
been developed specifically for the study of politics, yet the methodology of
each is statement analysis; as such these models are rooted in language,
ana so conform with the general discourse approach.
Security is the common referent of both the conventional wisdom and
the current debate. In particular, the President, as the custodian of nuclear
weapons, is the principle actor responsible for national security. The
powerful image of the President dominates the conventional wisdom, and retains significance in the contemporary ideological debate on the lessons of
the missile crisis.
The nuclear arsenal at the disposal of the President endows him with
great, but double-edged power. The paper concludes with some general
observations on the special significance of Presidential leadership as
represented in the discourse on the missile crisis, and as necessitated in
confronting crises in general. First, in crisis, there is little time for the
President to make difficult decisions. Secondly, there may be greater
devolution of authority to the military forces deployed to convey the
credibility of American deterrence. As such, the subordination of force to
policy must remain sound. The image of the President is, of necessity, an
image which combines prudence and strength. Manufactured images are
not enough however. Policy must be tested in terms of its alleged purpose.
Likewise, doctrine must be evaluated in terms the purpose of the policy it is
designed to support. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/42067 |
| Date | January 1990 |
| Creators | Guttieri, Karen Rochelle |
| Publisher | University of British Columbia |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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