With recent advancements in computer and network technologies, cyber-physical systems have become more susceptible to cyber-attacks; and production systems are no exception. Unlike traditional Information Technology (IT) systems, cyber-physical systems are not limited to attacks aimed at Intellectual Property (IP) theft, but also include attacks that maliciously affect the physical world. In manufacturing, such cyber-physical attacks can destroy equipment, force dimensional product changes, alter a product's mechanical characteristics, or endanger human lives.
The manufacturing industry often relies on modern Quality Control (QC) tools to protect against quality losses, such as those that can occur from an attack. However, cyber-physical attacks can still be designed to avoid detection by traditional QC methods, which suggests a strong need for new and more robust QC tools. Such new tools should be able to prevent, or at least minimize, the effects of cyber-physical attacks on production systems. Unfortunately, little to no research has been done on using QC tools for cyber-physical security of production systems.
Hence, the overarching goal of this work is to allow QC systems to be designed and used effectively as a second line of defense, when traditional cyber-security techniques fail and the production system is already breached. To this end, this work focuses on: 1) understanding the role of QC systems in cyber-physical attacks within manufacturing through developing a taxonomy encompassing the different layers involved; 2) identifying existing weaknesses in QC tools and exploring the effects of exploiting them by cyber-physical attacks; and 3) proposing more effective QC tools that can overcome existing weaknesses by introducing randomness to the tools, for better security against cyber-physical attacks in manufacturing. / Ph. D. / The recent technological developments in computers and networking have made systems, such as production systems, more vulnerable to attacks having both cyber and physical components; i.e., to cyber-physical attacks. In manufacturing, such attacks are not only capable of stealing valuable information, but can also destroy equipment, force physical product changes, alter product’s mechanical characteristics, or endanger human lives. Typically, the manufacturing industry have relied on various Quality Control (QC) tools, such as product inspection, to detect the effects caused by these attacks. However, these attacks could be still designed in a way to avoid detection by traditional QC methods, which suggests a need for new and more effective QC tools. Such new tools should be able to prevent, or at least minimize, the effects of these attacks in manufacturing. Unfortunately, almost no research has been done on using QC tools for securing production systems against these malicious attacks. Hence, the overarching goal of this work is to allow QC systems to be designed in a more effective manner to act as a second line of defense, when traditional cyber-security measures and attackers have already accessed the production system. To this end, this work focuses on: 1) understanding the role of QC systems during the attack; 2) identifying existing weaknesses in QC tools and determining the effects of exploiting them by the attack; and 3) proposing more effective QC tools, for better protection against these types of cyber-physical attacks in manufacturing.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/86725 |
| Date | 15 January 2019 |
| Creators | Elhabashy, Ahmed Essam |
| Contributors | Industrial and Systems Engineering, Camelio, Jaime A., Wells, Lee Jay, Kong, Zhenyu, Woodall, William H. |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
Page generated in 0.0018 seconds