This thesis consists of three essays in Political Economy: “China’s Political Business Cycle” uncovers the fact that the timing of China’s business cycle correlates to the timing of the Communist Party’s Congress and constructs a theory to explain the mechanism of the political business cycle. An empirical test of the theory derives a result consistent with the predictions of the theory. “A Theory of Dynastic Cycle” provides a politico-economic theory to explain the mechanism of the dynastic cycle, a repeating pattern in China’s theory. The core of the theory is the ruler’s trade-off between the political account and the economic account in choosing a successor. “A Politico-Economic Theory of Corruption in Non-Democracy” investigates the ruler’s incentive to have corrupt agents. The key point is that a corrupt agent has a bad reputation and is less likely to replace the incumbent ruler. The major implication is that unless there is fundamental institutional change, it is hard to eradicate corruption in non-democracy.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:su-83374 |
Date | January 2012 |
Creators | Li, Yinan |
Publisher | Stockholms universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet, Institutet för internationell ekonomi, Stockholm : Department of Economics, Stockholm Univeristy |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Doctoral thesis, monograph, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Relation | Monograph series / Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm, 0346-6892 ; 76 |
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