This thesis deals with David Hume's conception of resemblance, chiefly in the context of his theory of association of ideas. There, resemblance has a great theoretical significance for explanation of, besides other things, general ideas (or concepts). With connection to them the principal problem dealt with in this thesis shows itself best: If we interpret resemblance as sharing of properties, then by using it in explanation of concepts (that means properties as well) we are begging the question. One of the claims of this thesis is that Hume understands resemblance neither solely, nor primarily as sharing of properties but he regards it as a primitive relation, whose place is mainly in the imagination. It is therefore "perceived" resemblance. Hume's theory of association consequently presupposes "form" of the given, one aspect of which is resemblance (or similarity) in the abstract which is a "condition of possibility" of perceived resemblances. Particular resemblances fill this form with various content, which means that resemblance is in this sense relative (different individuals can perceive the resemblance between the same things differently). It appears that Hume's conception of resemblance is, according to this interpretation, basically in agreement with Nelson Goodman's conception of similarity, in...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:384163 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Hanzal, Tomáš |
| Contributors | Thein, Karel, Hill, James |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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