This thesis discusses questions about the legitimacy and scope of Aristotle's metaphysics as it applies to both living and non-living substances. Resolving such questions is necessary for articulating Aristotle's philosophical anthropology, and understanding the connections between Aristotle's major works. Terence Irwin provides one approach to establishing these connections, so I defend his account of Aristotle's Metaphysics from challenges that Aristotle's metaphysics of living things is mistaken and the scope of what things count as substances. I provide supporting arguments to show how Irwin's interpretation answers the first challenge and speculate how he could answer the second. By supporting Irwin, I hope to show that Irwin's argument, that a common philosophical method unites Aristotle's works, provides strong grounds for constructing Aristotle's philosophical anthropology. / Graduate
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/3587 |
Date | 03 October 2011 |
Creators | Gemelli, Thomas |
Contributors | Cameron, Margaret, Wilburn, Joshua J. |
Source Sets | University of Victoria |
Language | English, English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
Rights | Available to the World Wide Web |
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