Many developing countries depend on the World Bank for development assistance, which the Bank often provides with policy reform conditions. Resistance to World Bank’s conditionality caused the Bank to posit “ownership” as a country’s real assent to its development policies. The combination of ownership and conditionality invalidates the neocolonial, false-paradigm and dualism theses in explaining the international dependence development model. This study explains this model by investigating how the relationship between conditionality and ownership in the context of this model impacts forest management in Cameroon.
Integrating theoretical and methodological insights mainly from political science, economics, geosciences, and sociology, the study finds that in this model, conditionality and ownership have a hybrid relationship that fosters and hinders effective forest management in Cameroon. This finding positions policy hybridity within this model. It proposes a nouvelle way to understand international development policies’ interactions, and the effects of the interactions on natural resource management.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ETSU/oai:dc.etsu.edu:etd-3733 |
| Date | 01 May 2014 |
| Creators | Venard, Asongayi |
| Publisher | Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University |
| Source Sets | East Tennessee State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Electronic Theses and Dissertations |
| Rights | Copyright by the authors. |
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