This thesis considers the problem of finitely iterated rational secret sharing. We
describe how to evaluate this problem using game theory and finitely iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. The players each have a private horizon that the other player does
not know. The only thing that a player knows about their opponent’s private horizon
is a common upper bound. The description of a synchronous and asynchronous
finitely iterated secret sharing protocol with private information is followed by a game
theoretic proof of the viability of such protocols. / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/5844 |
| Date | 06 January 2015 |
| Creators | Foster, Chelsey |
| Contributors | Kapron, Bruce |
| Source Sets | University of Victoria |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Rights | Available to the World Wide Web, http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ |
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