Like writing, art making is primarily a means of human expression, a means of communication – both “allow us to categorize our (inner and outer) environment as represented by symbols” (Appignanesi, 1999: 7). Yet it is language in the traditional Western garb of rational, philosophical discourse that has been perceived as the primary means of manifesting knowledge and positing truth, not only regarding the character of human existence, but also the nature of art. This infers the acceptance of both works as literally “truth of things”, and of “a language of reason” that “perfectly represents the real world” (Appignanesi, 1999: 77). Going against the grain of this traditional bias, Jacques Derrida holds that, firstly, “human knowledge is not as controllable or as cogent as Western thinkers would have it”: secondly, that language functions in “subtle and often contradictory ways” thus rendering certainty, truth, and perfect representation ever elusive to us (Lye, 1997: 2); and, thirdly, that “practices of interpretation which include art but are not limited to language, are extended discourses” (Appignanesi, 1999: 79). So, the “work of reason” (or rationalism) in this sense, is no longer the definitive “voice” of authority when it comes to ascribing meaning, proclaiming a message, defining truth, etc. Having the grip of its authority loosened and thus its rigid, imposing borders opened up, the communication of knowledge as a form of “aesthetic fiction” (Megill, 1987: 265) is allowed entry into the rarefied field of philosophical discourse. Moreover, if visual art (one such “aesthetic fiction”) is a process of sign-making, as is written and spoken language; if it therefore constitutes a signifying system, as does written and spoken language (Bal and Bryson in Preziosi, 1998: 242); and, if art is not just about autonomous, in-house formalism, then can it not, in any case, validly offer a form for discourse, albeit a different kind of discourse, a discourse that is not “truth seeking” (Sim, 1992: 33)? Here, the maker of the proposed artwork-asdiscourse would not be attempting to establish the truth or falsity of a philosophical position, but, as Derrida would have it, create a form which, without mimicry, would evocatively allude to Plato, his “deconstructor” and the maker of the proposed artwork. Discourse in this sense, then, would generate “active interpretation… infinite free association” (Megill, 1987: 283), because, as in Derrida’s writing, interpretation no longer aims at “the reconciliation or unification of warring truths (Sim, 1992: 10); in other words, it breaks with the (phal)logocentric tradition of discourse as dialectical and becomes questioning without closure. For visual art to enter the exalted arena of philosophical discourse, it cannot be selfreflexive in the Greenbergian or formalist sense – it has to be about something philosophical and this ‘something’ will be a deconstructive response to Plato’s doctrine of the two worlds in the Timaeus. What I propose presenting, then, is an imagographic rather than (phal)logocentric exposition of philosophical content where the aim is not to shape a certainty or to infer an absolute presence or essence of anything, but rather to suggest traces of the maker of the artwork reading Derrida, reading Plato. The proposed artwork as a response to texts will thus be a “pre-text” of my own endeavour.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:nmmu/vital:10763 |
| Date | January 2002 |
| Creators | Ord, Jennifer |
| Publisher | Port Elizabeth Technikon, Faculty of Art and Design |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis, Masters, MTech (Fine Art) |
| Format | iv, 52 leaves, pdf |
| Rights | Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University |
Page generated in 0.0022 seconds