This study investigates the potential role of ownership structure as a determinant of the corporate dividend policy.
A firm's dividend policy is modelled as the outcome of a voting game among groups of asymmetrically informed shareholders, who also have different marginal tax rates for dividend income. The outcome of the voting game is determined by the relative voting powers of these shareholder groups. Voting power is denned as the probability that a particular block of shares will be pivotal in determining the outcome of the voting game.
Using Shapley values as instruments for shareholder groups' voting powers, data on firms which traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange during the 1976-88 period are employed
to test the model's predictions. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/31375 |
| Date | January 1990 |
| Creators | Verma, Savita |
| Publisher | University of British Columbia |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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