On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

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Previous issue date: 2007 / It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Links & Downloads

1. AZEVEDO, Eduardo Monteiro de. On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2007.
2. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/1616

Tags

Economia

Teoria dos jogos

Additional Fields

Identifer	oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/1616
Date	29 June 2007
Creators	Azevedo, Eduardo Monteiro de
Contributors	Carrasco, Vinícius, Krishna, Vijay, Maduro, Paulo, Mas-Colell, Andreu, Morris, Stephen, Escolas::EPGE, FGV, Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
Source Sets	IBICT Brazilian ETDs
Language	English
Detected Language	English
Type	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Source	reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV
Rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess