In the first chapter, I investigate how CEO’s risk incentive (vega) affects firm innovation. To establish causality, I exploit compensation changes instigated by the FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing at fair values. My identification tests indicate a positive and causal effect of CEOs’ vega on innovation activities. Furthermore, dampened managerial risk-taking incentive after the implementation of FAS 123R leads to a significant reduction in innovation related to firm’s core business and explorative inventions. It implies that managers diversify their innovation portfolios and decrease explorative inventions to curtail business risk when their risk-taking incentive is reduced. In the second chapter, I document that IPO underwriters implicitly collude on their price targets to support the stock post-IPO. While it is well known that underwriters are biased and have higher average price target (first moment), my evidence of implicit collusion is based on the dispersion in price target (second moment), with lower dispersion implying stronger implicit collusion. I find that, at initiation following expiry of quiet period, the dispersion in price target among underwriters of a firm is only 65% of that for non-underwriters. In 24.5% of the cases, at least two underwriters forecast the exact same price target. Such implicit collusion is also prevalent around lockup expiry. My results are robust to alternative, more direct, proxies for implicit collusion such as the proportion of underwriters that come out with exact same forecasts of price target. Refuting the alternative explanation that lower dispersion in price target among underwriters is due to common information that underwriters possess because of their involvement in the IPO, I find no such pattern in dispersion of Sales or EPS. In the last chapter, I study the security lending market. Stock lending markets are unique due to connections with stock markets: stock buyers become potential stock lenders. However, I show that equity loan supply is effectively fixed over time scales relevant to short sellers because short-term investors (less than three month holding period) do not lend shares. Transitions to stock specials are characterized by demand spikes, and slow-moving supply contributes to boom-and-bust cycles among stock specials. Consistent with my findings, I show stronger results among higher turnover stocks as well as around news events and earnings announcements. / Business Administration/Finance
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TEMPLE/oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/3930 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Zhang, Chi |
| Contributors | Mao, Connie X., Anderson, Ronald, Daniel, Naveen, John, Kose, Naveen, Lalitha, Basu, Sudipta, 1965- |
| Publisher | Temple University. Libraries |
| Source Sets | Temple University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis/Dissertation, Text |
| Format | 162 pages |
| Rights | IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available., http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Relation | http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/3912, Theses and Dissertations |
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