This thesis seeks to show the consistency and quality of Aristotle’s ontology in its treatment of worldly being(s) by examining how Aristotle treats a range of worldly phenomena. It does so by following Aristotle and considering (a) the structuring of worldly being in general by establishing that we exist as objects in a world of objects and that it is as determinate beings that we exhibit states and characteristics, (b) the structuring of our “physical” human engagement with the world through our exhibition of desire, choice, pleasure, and natural human biological development, (c) the structuring of our “mental” human engagement with the world through our human faculties for imagination, memory, and reason, (d) the structuring of organic being in accordance with the underlying concepts of limit (determinateness), priority (temporality), symmetry (duality), the “mean” (centredness), and proportion (dynamic wholeness), (e) the structuring of organic being as soul and matter, and (f) the meaning of “God” as the keystone of this system. It ultimately seeks to defend the value of Aristotle’s ontological or architectonic approach to the world and does so, implicitly and to some extent explicitly, vis-à-vis other philosophical approaches to the world.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:747072 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Jackson, Peter |
| Publisher | University College London (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10038833/ |
Page generated in 0.0091 seconds