This thesis is concerned with both mechanism design and political economy issues. The first chapter examines the conditions under which information aggregation (through an appropriately designed mechanism) can solve hidden-types (also commonly referred as adverse selection) problems. The remaining two chapters adopt a contract theory approach in order to explain prominent institutions of many contemporary political regimes. Chapter two provides a theory on why laws, which restrict the freedom of private parties to commit on certain transactions, may actually be beneficial for increasing social surplus and promoting economic growth and how the evolution of these laws interacts with the process of economic development. Finally, chapter three examines the issue on how the separation between the legislative and the executive branch of a government can complement political competition in order to achieve an efficient provision of public goods.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:582181 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Boukouras, Aristotelis |
| Publisher | University of Warwick |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/55434/ |
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