In international economics literature, different variants of the Nash equilibrium have been used to formulate strategic and retaliative behavior. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the "contingent threat situation" (Greenberg, 1990) to reformulate three different international economic environments. / First, a two-country, two-commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash equilibrium outcome, a non-free trade outcome. We show, in the framework of the "theory of social situations", that the free trade equilibrium is supported by a "stable standard of behavior". / Second, the basic two-country, single commodity model is employed to formulate the interactive and retaliatory policies regarding the choice between foreign investment and immigration. Considering three different strategic environments, we investigate the outcomes supported by "stable standards of behavior" under these strategic scenarios. We also provide a critical examination of Jones-Coelho-Easton's proposition (Jones, Coelho, and Easton, 1986). / Third, a simple model of international debt is formulated using a strategic form game. In the game, a country in financial crisis and on the verge of default is requesting a new loan, and a bank, with exposure to the foreign country's debt, contemplates whether it should issue the new loan. We show that "issue a new loan" and "not default", a Pareto optimum pair of strategies, is stable. Interestingly, we get this result by using a non-cooperative negotiation process, offered by the "individual contingent threat situation".
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.36784 |
Date | January 2000 |
Creators | Oladi, Gholamreza. |
Contributors | Greenberg, Joseph (advisor) |
Publisher | McGill University |
Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Format | application/pdf |
Coverage | Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Economics.) |
Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
Relation | alephsysno: 001781782, proquestno: NQ69912, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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