My dissertation consists of two unrelated essays. In the first essay, "Wage Subsidy in an Optimal Redistribution Program", I analyze the efficiency of income transfers and wage subsidies as instruments of income redistribution in an optimal taxation framework. I extend the Mirrlees model (1971) of income inequality by specifying a model in which individuals' productivity and wages depend on investment in skill acquisition in addition to ability. The principal result of the research is that a wage subsidy has an important role to play in an optimal system of income maintenance. In the second essay, "Bundling Hardware and Software", a class of simple models is analyzed to explain prevailing bundling practices in computer markets. A profit-maximizing monopolist may over-provide hardware-software bundles, practice "pure bundling" when preferences are symmetric with respect to software, and under-bundle and under-produce software when preferences are asymmetric.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:RICE/oai:scholarship.rice.edu:1911/18054 |
| Date | January 2000 |
| Creators | Zarovnyi, Alexei |
| Contributors | Mieszkowski, Peter |
| Source Sets | Rice University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis, Text |
| Format | 115 p., application/pdf |
Page generated in 0.0132 seconds