<p>The dissertation consists of three essays. The first
essay describes and estimates the model of bidding on eBay.
Internet auctions (such as eBay) differ from the traditional
auction format in that participants 1) typically face a choice
over several simultaneous auctions and 2) often have limited
information about rival bidders. Since existing economic models do
not account for these features of the bidding environment, it
should not be surprising that even casual empiricism reveals a
sharp discrepancy between the predictions of existing theory and
the actual behavior of bidders. In this paper, I show that the
presence of multiple, contemporaneous auctions for similar items
coupled with uncertainty regarding rival entry can explain both
features. I analyze these features in a continuous-time stochastic
auction model with endogenous entry, in which bidder types are
differentiated by their initial information regarding the entry
process. Empirical estimates using eBay auctions of pop-music CDs
confirm my theoretical prediction that the rate of entry depends
on price. I then test my model against alternative explanations of
observed bidding behavior using a detailed field experiment.</p><p>
The second essay is on empirical analysis of executive
compensation in the continuous-time environment. In this essay, I
develop a methodology for the identification and non-parametric
estimation of a continuous-time principal-agent model. My
framework extends the existing literature on optimal dynamic
contracts by allowing for the presence of unobserved state
variables. To accommodate such heterogeneity, I develop an
estimation method based on numerically solving for the optimal
non-linear manager's response to the restrictions of the contract.
To demonstrate this feature, I apply my methodology to executive
contracts from the retail apparel industry.</p><p>The third essay provides a tractable methodology for the
construction and structural estimation of continuous time dynamic
models. The specific class of models covered by my framework
includes competitive dynamic games where there are no direct
spillovers between objective functions of players. I develop an
estimation methodology based on the properties of the equilibrium
of the model. The methodology that I design can be applied to
welfare and revenue analysis of large dynamic models. As an
example, I compute the revenue and welfare gains for a
counter-factual exercise in which the eBay auction website changes
the format of its auctions from second-price to a flexible ending.</p> / Dissertation
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DUKE/oai:dukespace.lib.duke.edu:10161/678 |
| Date | 08 April 2008 |
| Creators | Nekipelov, Denis |
| Contributors | Hong, Han, Khan, Shakeeb |
| Source Sets | Duke University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | 1112648 bytes, application/pdf |
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