This thesis contains three chapters related to the microeconomic interactions in markets. The first paper deals with markets with many participants, and in which monetary transfers are allowed, and studies core convergence. The second paper considers reputation building in time-limited negotiations. The third paper studies two-sided markets with no monetary transfers, governed by stable matching mechanisms. / Business Economics
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:harvard.edu/oai:dash.harvard.edu:1/17467296 |
| Date | 17 July 2015 |
| Creators | Romm, Assaf |
| Contributors | Roth, Alvin E. |
| Publisher | Harvard University |
| Source Sets | Harvard University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | open |
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