Chapter 1: Remanufacturing: Remanufacturing is a form of recycling where used durable goods are refurbished to a condition comparable to new products. With reduced energy and resource consumption, remanufactured goods are produced at a fraction of the original cost and with lower emissions of pollution. This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The component needing to be replaced creates an aftermarket. An environmental regulation assessing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced The main results indicate that a social planner could use collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability as a substitute for environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. One of the results also coincides with the Porter Hypothesis.
Chapter 2: Transboundary movements of waste: In a stylized model of international trade, a monopolist in the North exports second-hand products to a representative firm in the South to be reused as intermediate goods, with potential trade gains. The degree of reusability of waste products is a crucial choice variable in the North. This is because with a lack of international vigilance, non-reusable waste can be mixed illegally with the reusable waste. I explore the driving forces for the movement of illegal waste, paying particular attention to the role of local waste regulations, such as the EU's Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment directive. Under mild conditions, it is shown that increased regulation stringency in the North leads its firm to reduce the degree of reusability of its products. As a result, the flow of non-reusable waste to the South increases, providing another channel for the Pollution Haven Hypothesis.
Chapter3: Is Democracy good for the environment? The role of private mitigation efforts: We study the question posed in the title in the context of open economies where trade and welfare depend on the extent to which regulation permits the environment to be used as an input in production, and where individuals may privately mitigate the consequences of pollution at a cost. Governments may also manage the openness of the economy to trade directly as well as indirectly via environmental regulation. In this framework, we compare the degree of regulatory stringency and the level of pollution that emerge in the equilibria of a set of political regimes that range from autocratic to fully competitive or democratic. The answer to the question is not straightforward in this investigation because many well-off-citizens in democratic countries may prefer the higher gross incomes that come with freer trade and unregulated production.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uottawa.ca/oai:ruor.uottawa.ca:10393/30082 |
| Date | January 2010 |
| Creators | Bernard, Sophie |
| Publisher | University of Ottawa (Canada) |
| Source Sets | Université d’Ottawa |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 101 p. |
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