The effect of federal revenue assistance to state and local governments on their respective fiscal decisions is analyzed in an original, neoclassical economic model. This model more accurately describes the incentive structure facing each recipient government constituency. From this model, implications are derived which are descriptive of empirically observed behavior by state and local governments receiving federal grants. / However, these implications are not the result of self-serving behavioral traits that are exogenously imposed upon donor or recipient governments, but rather the direct result of the incentive structure faced by the grant receiving state and local government constituencies in a system of fiscal federalism. / Data from the fifty states on total revenue and expenditure levels of combined state and local governments is utilized from the last thirty years to test the implications derived from the model. Cross-sectional regression analysis is combined with time series analysis to determine whether federal revenue assistance to state and local governments: (1) increases income elasticity of demand for recipient government goods and services; (2) decreases recipient government own-source tax burdens; (3) decreases the competition between state jurisdictions for a mobile tax base by increasing the homogeneity across states of locally provided programs. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 54-07, Section: A, page: 2667. / Major Professor: Randall G. Holcombe. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1993.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_76962 |
| Contributors | Stroup, Michael Dean., Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text |
| Format | 157 p. |
| Rights | On campus use only. |
| Relation | Dissertation Abstracts International |
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