This thesis is concerned with a fundamental unit of the economy: Households. Even in advanced economies, upwards of 70% of the population live in households composed of multiple people. A large number of decisions are taken at the level of the household, that is to say, they are taken jointly by household members: How to raise children, how much and when to work, how many cartons of milk to purchase. How these decisions are made is therefore of great importance for the people who live in them and for their well-being.But precisely because household members make decisions jointly it is hard to know how they come about and to what extent they benefit individual members. This is why households are often viewed as unique decision makers in economics. Even if they contain multiple people, they are treated as though they were a single person with a single set of preferences. This unitary approach is often sufficient and can be a helpful simplification. But in many situations it does not deliver an adequate description of household behavior. For instance, the unitary model does not permit the study of individual wellbeing and inequality inside the household. In addition, implications of the unitary model have been rejected repeatedly in the demand literature.Bargaining models offer an alternative where household members have individual preferences and come to joint decisions in various ways. There are by now a great number of such models, all of which allow for the study of bargaining power, a measure of the influence a member has in decision making. This concept is important because it has implications for the welfare of individuals. If one household member’s bargaining power increases, the household’s choices will be more closely aligned with that member’s preferences, ceteris paribus.The three chapters below can be divided into two parts. The first part consists of Chapter 1, which looks to detect the influence of intra-household bargaining in a specific set of consumption choices: Consumption of the arts. The research in this chapter is designed to measure aspects of the effect of bargaining power in this domain, but does not seek to quantify bargaining power itself or to infer economic well-being of household members.Precisely this last point, however, is the focus of the second part of the thesis, consisting of Chapters 2 and 3. These focus specifically on the recovery of one measure of bargaining power, the resource share. Resource shares have the advantage of being interpretable in terms of economic well-being, which is not true of all such measures. They are estimated as part of structural models of household demand. These models are versions of the collective model of household decision making.Pioneered by Chiappori (1988) and Apps and Rees (1988), the collective model has become the go-to alternative to unitary approaches, where the household is seen as a single decision-making unit with a single well-behaved utility function. Instead, the collective model allows for individual utility functions for each member of the household. The model owes much of its success to the simplicity of its most fundamental assumption: That whatever the structure of the intra-household bargaining process, outcomes are Pareto-efficient. This means that no member can be made better off, without making another worse off. Though the model nests unitary models as special cases, it does have testable implications.The first chapter of the thesis is entitled “Household Decisions on Arts Consumption” and is joint work with Caterina Mauri, who has also collaborated with me on many other projects in her capacity as my girlfriend. In it, we explore the role of intra-household bargaining in arts consumption. We do this by estimating demand for various arts and cultural events such as the opera or dance performances using a large number of explanatory variables. One of these variables plays a special role. This variable is a distribution factor, meaning that it can be reasonably assumed to affect consumption only through the bargaining process, and not by modifying preferences. Such variables play an important role in the household bargaining literature. Here, three such variables are used. Among them is the share of household income that is contributed by the husband, the canonical distribution factor.The chapter fits into a literature on drivers of arts consumption, which has shown that in addition to such factors as age, income and education, spousal preferences and characteristics are important in determining how much and which cultural goods are consumed. Gender differences in preferences in arts consumption have also been shown to be important and to persist after accounting for class, education and other socio-economic factors (Bihagen and Katz-Gerro, 2000).We explore to what extent this difference in preferences can be used to shed light on the decision process in couples’ households. Using three different distribution factors, we infer whether changes in the relative bargaining power of spouses induce changes in arts consumption.Using a large sample from the US Current Population Survey which includes data on the frequency of visits to various categories of cultural activities, we regress atten- dance rates on a range of socio-economic variables using a suitable count data model.We find that attendance by men at events such as the opera, ballet and other dance performances, which are more frequently attended by women than by men, show a significant influence of the distribution factors. This significant effect persists irrespec- tively of which distribution factor is used. We conclude that more influential men tend to participate in these activities less frequently than less influential men, conditionally on a host of controls notably including hours worked.The second chapter centers around the recovery of resource shares. This chapter is joint work with Denni Tommasi, a fellow PhD student at ECARES. It relies on the collective model of the household, which assumes simply that household decisions are Pareto-efficient. From this assumption, a relatively simple household problem can be formulated. Households can be seen as maximizers of weighted sums of their members’ utility functions. Importantly the weights, known as bargaining weights (or bargaining power), may depend on many factors, including prices. The household problem in turn implies structure for household demand, which is observed in survey data.Collective demand systems do not necessarily identify measures of bargaining power however. In fact, the ability to recover such a measure, and especially one that is useful for welfare analysis, was an important milestone in the literature. It was reached by (Browning et al. 2013) (henceforth BCL), with a collective model capable of identi- fying resource shares (also known as a sharing rule). These shares provide a measure of how resources are allocated in the household and so can be used to study intra- household consumption inequality. They also take into account that households gen- erate economies of scale for their members, a phenomenon known as a consumption technology: By sharing goods such as housing, members of households can generate savings that can be used elsewhere.Estimation of these resource shares involves expressing household budget shares functions of preferences, a consumption technology and a sharing rule, each of which is a function of observables, and letting the resulting system loose on the data. But obtaining such a demand system is not free. In addition to the usual empirical speci- fications of the various parts of the system, an identifying assumption has to be made to assure that resource shares can be recovered in estimation. In BCL, this is the assumption that singles and adult members of households share the same preferences. In Chapter 2, however, an alternative assumption is used.In a recent paper, Dunbar et al. (2013) (hereafter DLP) develop a collective model based on BCL that allows to identify resource shares using assumptions on the simi- larity of preferences within and between households. The model uses demand only for assignable goods, a favorite of household economists. These are goods such as mens’ clothing and womens’ clothing for which it is known who in a household consumes them. In this chapter, we show why, especially when the data exhibit relatively flat Engel curves, the model is weakly identified and induces high variability and an im- plausible pattern in least squares estimates.We propose an estimation strategy nested in their framework that greatly reduces this practical impediment to recovery of individual resource shares. To achieve this, we follow an empirical Bayes method that incorporates additional (or out-of-sample) information on singles and relies on mild assumptions on preferences. We show the practical usefulness of this strategy through a series of Monte Carlo simulations and by applying it to Mexican data.The results show that our approach is robust, gives a plausible picture of the house- hold decision process, and is particularly beneficial for the practitioner who wishes to apply the DLP framework. Our welfare analysis of the PROGRESA program in Mexico is the first to include separate poverty rates for men and women in a CCT program.The third Chapter addresses a problem similar to the one discussed in Chapter 2. The goal, again, is to estimate resource shares and to remedy issues of imprecision and instability in the demand systems that can deliver them. Here, the collective model used is based on Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), and uses data on the entire basket of goods that households consume. The identifying assumption is similar to that used by BCL, although I allow for some differences in preferences between singles and married individuals.I set out to improve the precision and stability of the resulting estimates, and so to make the model more useful for welfare analysis. In order to do so, this chapter approaches, for the first time, the estimation of a collective household demand system from a Bayesian perspective. Using prior information on equivalence scales, as well as restrictions implied by theory, tight credible intervals are found for resource shares, a measure of the distribution of economic well-being in a household. A modern MCMC sampling method provides a complete picture of the high-dimensional parameter vec- tor’s posterior distribution and allows for reliable inference.The share of household earnings generated by a household member is estimated to have a positive effect on her share of household resources in a sample of couples from the US Consumer Expenditure survey. An increase in the earnings share of one percentage point is estimated to result in a shift of between 0.05% and 0.14% of household resources in the same direction, meaning that spouses partially insure one another against such shifts. The estimates imply an expected shift of 0.71% of household resources from the average man to the average woman in the same sample between 2008 and 2012, when men lost jobs at a greater rate than women.Both Chapters 2 and 3 explore unconventional ways to achieve gains in estimator precision and reliability at relatively little cost. This represents a valuable contribution to a literature that, for all its merits in complexity and ingenious modeling, has not yet seriously endeavored to make itself empirically useful. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ulb.ac.be/oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/253871 |
| Date | 12 July 2017 |
| Creators | Wolf, Alexander |
| Contributors | De Rock, Bram, Gassner, Marjorie, Verardi, Vincenzo, Paindaveine, Davy, Bargain, Olivier, Cherchye, Laurens |
| Publisher | Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Bruxelles |
| Source Sets | Université libre de Bruxelles |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/openurl/vlink-dissertation |
| Format | 3 full-text file(s): application/pdf | application/pdf | application/pdf |
| Rights | 3 full-text file(s): info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess |
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