This thesis argues that Hannah Arendt is correct to suggest that thinking enables judgment, even though Arendt never fully formulates this idea herself. I provide a critical reading of Arendts essay Thinking and Moral Considerations and of her series of lectures on Kants political philosophy. I argue that Arendts concept of impartiality can provide the bridge between the concepts of thinking and judging that is otherwise lacking in her account of these faculties. I argue that Arendts philosophy can be construed as an ethically relevant theory: despite the fact that Arendt offers no moral prescriptions, she describes a process of thinking through which ethical decisions can be made. Arendts work is therefore highly relevant as a critique of relativism, nihilism and the skeptical notion that judgments are arbitrary.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:AEU.10048/1332 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | MacLeod, Damon |
| Contributors | Burch, Robert (Philosophy), Dudiak, Jeffrey (Philosophy), Welchman, Jennifer (Philosophy), Carmichael, Don (Political Science) |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 408962 bytes, application/pdf |
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