The topic of this diploma thesis is the position of scientific realism presented in the framework of naturalized philosophy of science. The aim is to clarify this position and to show that if one denies realism, scientific practice does not make sense. For this purpose main focus is first devoted to the key parts (metaphysical realism, semantic realism, and epistemological realism) which constitute the scientific realism. Next, a detailed analysis of the arguments against and in favor of realism is offered, and concrete examples taken from the sciences are used to illustrate key points. Space is also devoted to the analysis of a physical theory of heat of the 18th and 19th centuries in connection with an antirealist argument directed at the history of science. Also, one of the few fully elaborated antirealist positions, constructive empiricism, is presented and critically evaluated. In a similar fashion, this thesis pays attention to a specific form of realism, called entity realism. Though the resulting image is a thoroughly realist position, this position strives to accurately capture the numerous nuances of the scientific practice, offering a fresh perspective on some of the traditional views.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:350713 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Zach, Martin |
| Contributors | Kvasz, Ladislav, Kunca, Tomáš |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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