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U.S. biodefense and homeland security toward detection and attribution

American leaders face tough decisions about the role of biodefense in homeland security. Debate centers on U.S. preparedness for biological attack, but few if any have adequately defined "preparedness." This thesis defines bioterrorism preparedness in terms of detection and attribution. Through case studies of the 1984 Rajneeshee cult and 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, the thesis develops a notional model of biodefense that shows that nature of attack and the lethality or type of agent influence outbreak detection and biological weapons attribution. Because public health surveillance facilitates detection and interagency coordination facilitates attribution, there is a need to re-balance U.S. biodefense priorities by easing emphasis on current programs, and redirecting resources to simpler improvements in communication and organizational efficiency. Core limitations of the public health system that impede surveillance are discussed, and barriers between public health and law enforcement officials that hamper coordination are examined. Recommendations are provided to improve detection through better surveillance, and to enable attribution through better coordination and information sharing.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:nps.edu/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/2386
Date12 1900
CreatorsBernett, Brian C.
ContributorsLavoy, Peter R., Clunan, Anne L., Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)., National Security Affairs
PublisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Source SetsNaval Postgraduate School
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
Formatxvi, 124 p. : ill. ;, application/pdf
RightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined
in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the
public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States
Code, Section 105, is not copyrighted in the U.S., Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

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