Return to search

In Defense of Moderate Empiricism

There are two dominant approaches to theorizing the a priori in epistemology. Moderate rationalism, a kind of dogmatism, posits intellectual seeming’s, while moderate empiricism accounts for the a priori in terms of analyticity. Paul Boghossian has been a recent defender of moderate empiricism until recently. He has argued that there is no “internalistically” acceptable way for a moderate empiricist to account for all instances of a priori justified belief, so we must supplement the view with a form of moderate rationalism. Against this it is shown that dogmatism in general is problematic as a theory of justification, and that, when applied to cases of a priori justification it faces an insuperable difficulty, the non-accidental relation problem. It is argued that in order to account for the a priori we should defend moderate empiricism as the only plausible option. A positive proposal is offered at the end of the paper. The theory states that a priori warrant is a function of non-evidential factors that cause justified a priori belief. / Philosophy

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:TEMPLE/oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/9535
Date12 1900
CreatorsHilt, David Benjamin
ContributorsAlshanetsky, Eli
PublisherTemple University. Libraries
Source SetsTemple University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis/Dissertation, Text
Format31 pages
RightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available., http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Relationhttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/9497, Theses and Dissertations

Page generated in 0.0018 seconds