<p> The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) is the ethical principle that doing harm is morally worse than allowing harm. The objective of this thesis is to show that the DDA is not a viable principle without supplementation. Deontological and consequentialist approaches to the DDA are explored in this thesis. Both approaches are rejected due to the limitations of the binary approach to harms—the binary approach to harms is the assumption that the badness of harms is best captured by two strict categories of doing and allowing. This thesis develops a sliding-scale approach to harms. This approach is developed by using axiology–value theory. Value theory is used by consequentialism to determine what goods should be maximized by action and how those goods are ranked. This thesis uses the axiological methodology of Fred Feldman to create a more complex account of the badness of harms. The final chapter of this thesis applies the sliding-scale approach to harms to three end-of-life, medical cases.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PROQUEST/oai:pqdtoai.proquest.com:1555295 |
| Date | 13 June 2014 |
| Creators | Cleary, Christine |
| Publisher | Kent State University |
| Source Sets | ProQuest.com |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | thesis |
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