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Living in the "Age of Accountability": How Co-Decision Empowers the European Parliament in the Design of EU Agencies

Bátora alleges that political accountability has been “almost entirely overlooked” (2010, 2) in studies of the European External Action Service. An examination of the subject that extends previous studies on agency design, the co-decision procedure, the “democratic deficit,” and European Union foreign policy would resolve the neglect. As a result, the study derives a hypothesis from an established theory of bureaucratic structure. Findings suggest that during the design of EU agencies co-decision power improves the ability of the European Parliament to institutionalize methods of accountability to it.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:digitalarchive.gsu.edu:political_science_theses-1037
Date07 May 2011
CreatorsKenard, Patrick C
PublisherDigital Archive @ GSU
Source SetsGeorgia State University
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourcePolitical Science Theses

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