Evolutionary game theory tries to explain the emergence of stable behaviors observed in human and animal societies. Prominent examples of such behaviors are cooperative and conformist behaviors. In the first part of the thesis, we develop a model of indirect reciprocity with institutional screening to study how institutions may promote cooperative behavior. We show that cooperation can emerge if screening institutions are sufficiently reliable at identifying cooperators. The second part presents a large-population learning model in which individuals update their beliefs through time. In the model, only one individual updates his beliefs each period. We show that a population, playing a game with two strategies, eventually learns to play a Nash equilibrium. We focus on coordination games and prove that a unique behavior arises both when players use myopic and perturbed best replies. The third part studies the payoff calculation in an evolutionary setting. By introducing mutual consent as a requirement for game play, we provide a more realistic alternative way to compute payoffs. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript. Paper 3: Manuscript.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:su-132433 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Ghachem, Montasser |
| Publisher | Stockholms universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholm : Department of Economics, Stockholm University |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | Dissertations in Economics, 1404-3491 ; 2016:2 |
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