This thesis deals with stock options as a form of executive compensation of a joint stock company. The aim of the thesis was to clarify the reasons that lead companies to decide to reward the executive with stock options, to find out what positive and negative consequences such a decision has, to present the legal regulation of stock options in the legal system of the Czech Republic and Germany and to compare these legal regulations. The most common reasons for rewarding executives with stock options are the desire to align the interests of shareholders and executives, the desire to retain key members of the executive, the desire to reduce risk aversion on the part of the executive, advantageous tax regulation or the desire to maintain high cash flow. Rewarding with stock options can also be used as a tool for the natural selection of executives according to their attitude to risk, which rewarding with stock options provides. If the option agreement does not contain a sufficiently long vesting period, retention period, dividend protection and an exercise price linked to an appropriate market index, the granting of stock options, rather than aligning the interests of shareholders and executives, may lead to a fixation on short-term performance, undue risk- taking or exacerbation of the free cash...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:455324 |
| Date | January 2022 |
| Creators | Turek, Jan |
| Contributors | Hurychová, Klára, Černá, Stanislava |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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