Newly listed firms have a short history of stock value, and may initially not rely on stock price information in incentive contracting as much as seasoned firms. In this thesis, I examine managerial incentive contracts in newly listed firms by comparing CEO compensation between IPO firms and seasoned firms. For IPOs listed on NYSE from 1993 to 2001, a matching sample of seasoned firms was obtained according to criteria in industry, size and book-to-market ratio. By examining the multi-dimensions of CEO incentives, including cash compensation, option grants, stock ownership, and dismissal for the first six years after listing, I document significant differences between IPOs and seasoned firms. I find that while the sensitivity of short-term incentive pay to shareholder return is lower in IPOs than in seasoned firms, long-term incentives from CEO stock ownership are significantly more important in newly listed firms. Moreover, although CEO turnover in an IPO firm is lower, it depends on both stock-price return and accounting performance. These IPO-seasoned differences diminish over time and disappear in three to five years. My findings suggest that to motivate the manager of a newly listed firm, the board avoids short-term uncertainty associated with new stocks while emphasizing the role of shareholder value in the long run. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Master / Master of Philosophy
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:HKU/oai:hub.hku.hk:10722/174342 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Chen, Jie, 陈洁 |
| Contributors | Zhou, X |
| Publisher | The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) |
| Source Sets | Hong Kong University Theses |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | PG_Thesis |
| Source | http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B47179065 |
| Rights | The author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights) and the right to use in future works., Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License |
| Relation | HKU Theses Online (HKUTO) |
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