An investigation into whether Plato was committed to separate Forms in the Phaedo. Two accounts of separation are distinguished: Gail Fine's modal account where separation is a capacity to exist independendently from sensible particulars, and Daniel D. Devereux' non-modal account where separation is equivalent with non-immanence. I analyse multiple key passages of the Phaedo using these accounts of separation, to see whether any passage commits Plato to separation understood in either modal or non-modal terms. I argue and conclude that there is no evidence of Plato being committed to separation in the Phaedo, understanding separation in either modal or non-modal terms.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-521443 |
| Date | January 2024 |
| Creators | Wilhelmsson, Johannes |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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