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Models of scientific explanation

Ever since Hempel and Oppenheim's development of the Deductive Nomological model
of scientific explanation in 1948, a great deal of philosophical energy has been dedicated
to constructing a viable model of explanation that concurs both with our intuitions and
with the general project of science. Here I critically examine the developments in this
field of study over the last half century, and conclude that Humphreys' aleatory model is
superior to its competitors. There are, however, some problems with Humphreys'
account of the relative quality of an explanation, so in the end I develop and defend a
modified version of the aleatory account.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:tamu.edu/oai:repository.tamu.edu:1969.1/2372
Date29 August 2005
CreatorsSutton, Peter Andrew
ContributorsBurch, Robert
PublisherTexas A&M University
Source SetsTexas A and M University
Languageen_US
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeBook, Thesis, Electronic Thesis, text
Format341595 bytes, electronic, application/pdf, born digital

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