過去研究多將焦點集中在增加高階經理人薪酬，將可促使高階經理人為公司股東的權益努力，為此探討提昇股東權益包含高階經理人獎酬與公司績效間的關聯，卻忽略了其與風險間的關係。高階經理人員可能因為獎酬的激勵，從事對公司有利且風險較低的計畫，也可能會為了提高自身的權利，將風險轉嫁給公司，因此激發出探討高階經理人員獎酬與公司風險間的關係的研究動機。
本研究以KMV模型之預期違約率作為公司風險之參數，探討高階經理人之
薪酬、自由現金流量、KMV信用風險之關係，同時瞭解公司規模是否影響高階
經理人薪酬、自由現金流量及公司績效與公司KMV信用風險間的關係。
研究結果顯示，公司高階經理人的薪酬與公司違約風險呈負相關，即高階經理人薪酬的提高，確能降低公司的違約風險，但此現象僅在大規模公司才能發現。此外，就自由現金流量而言，小規模公司之自由現金流量愈多，存在較高的風險，惟有提高公司營運績效，方能減緩公司風險的承擔。另一方面，對於高階經理人薪酬的提升，雖然在小規模公司並沒有效果，但係有助減緩自由現金流量帶來的負向衝擊。最後，前述小結僅存在於小規模公司群體，這可能是因為，大公司擁有較高的政治成本，因此為了避免社會的關注，大公司較小公司有較好的公司治理機制，因此管理當局較不可能基於自利的動機來影響公司的風險。 / Many past researches focused on senior manager will be able to work hard for raising shareholder’s equity because of higher compensation. Many researches of raising stakeholder’s equity explored the relation between senior manager compensation and financial performance, but ignored the relation with credit risk of company. Senior managers maybe perform lower or higher risk project for themselves benefit due to some higher compensation motivation. Thus this researching will refocus on exploring the relation between senior manager compensation and company credit risk.
This study will discuss the relation among senior manager compensation, FCF and KMV company credit risk by EDF of KMV model as a parameter of company credit risk. And to understand the scale of company weather influence the relation among senior manager compensation, FCF and KMV company credit risk?
The results of this research show that the senior manager compensation is negatively correlated with company credit default risk. On the other hand, higher senior manager compensation will reduce the risk of company credit default, but this phenomenon can be found only in lager companies. In addition, as far as small company's FCF, the more FCF, the more there is a higher risk. Increase company's operating performance, the company credit risk can be slow down. On the other hand, in small company there is no effect on raising senior manager compensation, but it will help mitigate the negative impact of FCF. Finally, the foregoing summary is just only in small company groups, may be because larger companies have higher political cost, so in order to avoid the concern of society, larger companies have better corporate governance than small companies, thus senior manager will not be able to influence the company’s credit risk for their self-interested motivation.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0098932017 |
| Creators | 胡營欽, Hu, Ying Ching |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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