This paper studies the relationship between firm performance, proxied by Tobin's Q, and two distinct ownership types, managerial owned firms and outside owned firms. The sample consists of 2005 young firms from Europe and the US that incorporated since the dot-com-bubble 2001. Very similar to the pre-2001 period, young and highly funded firms are of popular concern. In particular their owners, founders and CEOs are topic of interest and serve as figurehead for their company, raising the question whether their firms perform better if they also own them or not and whether that differs with the institutional framework that the company is situated in. Thus the research question is the following: What is the effect of having management as majority shareholder(s) on the performance of the young firm in different environments? To find an answer, I used quantitative data from Orbis and analyzed it using time-series panel data, recent information using simple OLS as well as multiple analyses of variance. I find evidence of higher valuations of firms owned by managers, especially in countries with common law and stronger shareholder rights. I also find evidence of relatively lower valuations of firms owned by their managers when these are situated in code law countries or countries with stronger creditor rights. A surprising addition to the findings were extreme values of Tobin's Q that may indicate another bubble in the making, coincidentally closing the circle of this study.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-317047 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Bogdanski, Daniel |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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