本研究旨在探討公司規模及產業競爭對CEO現金薪酬與股票報酬敏感性之影響。根據Leone et al. (2006)之研究，認為依未實現利得而給付之現金薪酬將產生事後交割成本，未實現損失可能遞延CEO之決策責任。由於未實現損益可反映至股票報酬上，因此有效率的現金薪酬契約對含有未實現利得之正股票報酬的敏感性低於含有未實現損失之負股票報酬，顯示現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬之敏感性呈現不對稱關係。本研究以此文獻作延伸，探究CEO現金薪酬與股票報酬之敏感關聯性及其不對稱性關係是否受公司規模與產業競爭之影響。
以ExecuComp資料庫2000年至2009年的CEO現金薪酬樣本進行迴歸分析，結果發現公司規模愈大，現金薪酬對市場績效之敏感性愈大，顯示為避免CEO從事會計盈餘管理，公司現金薪酬之給付更著重於市場績效之衡量；產業競爭方面，產業競爭愈激烈，現金薪酬與市場績效之敏感性愈小，符合風險差異化假說。關於CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬敏感性之不對稱關係，實證結果顯示大規模公司及產業競爭程度較高者對CEO決策之審慎性更加要求，因此CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬敏感性之不對稱的差距愈大。 / This study investigates the effect of firm size and industry competition on the asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to the stock returns. Leone et al. (2006) shows that since stock returns include both unrealized gains and losses, cash compensation would be less sensitive to stock returns when returns contains unrealized gains (positive returns) than when returns contain unrealized losses (negative returns). As an extension, this study examines whether firm size and industry competition affect the sensitivity of cash compensation to market performance and the asymmetry of sensitivity of cash compensation to stock returns.
Based on the CEO cash compensation during 2000 and 2009 from ExecuComp database, the empirical results show that the firm size has positive effect on sensitivity of cash compensation to market performance while the industry competition has negative effect. Moreover, the asymmetry of sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns increases as firm size and industry competition increase.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0098353027 |
| Creators | 王姿惠 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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