Managing a common property resource, especially one jointly owned by two nations, is a formidable problem as it involves both incentives to cooperate and incentives to cheat. Often conflicts flare up, followed by efforts of reconciliation, which are interrupted again by new conflicts. A classic example of this is the Pacific salmon fishery, which is jointly harvested by the U.S.A and Canada. To understand the nature of this conflict, and to make policy recommendations, a game-theoretic approach is developed in this thesis.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.20879 |
| Date | January 1998 |
| Creators | Tian, Huilan, 1964- |
| Contributors | Thomassin, Paul J. (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Science (Department of Agricultural Economics.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001610123, proquestno: MQ44298, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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