Evolutionary stability is a necessary condition for imitative dynamics of policy learning
and innovation to come to a rest. We apply this concept to profit tax competition
in a regime where a common and consolidated profit tax base for multi-jurisdictional
firms is divided among governments by means of formulary apportionment. In evolutionary
play, governments exhibit aggregate-taking behavior: when comparing
their performance with others, they ignore their impact on the consolidated tax
base. Consequently, evolutionarily stable tax rates are less efficient than tax rates
in best-response tax competition. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:5899 |
| Date | 10 1900 |
| Creators | Wagener, Andreas |
| Publisher | WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Universität Wien |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Paper, NonPeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078969, http://epub.wu.ac.at/5899/ |
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