In order to understand the implications of Frege's Grundlagen der Arithmetik, we must bear in mind that Frege saw logic as an overarching discipline, necessary for all scientific enquiry. This consideration allows us to make sense of his logicism, the idea that arithmetic is embedded in logic, and his platonism, the commitment to the mind-independent nature of arithmetic objects, such as numbers. In 1902, Russell generated a paradox from Basic Law (V), found in the first volume of Grundgesetze, which suggested that Frege's entire logical system was inconsistent. Recent work by Boolos and Wright, have fenced off the damage and shown that the bulk of Frege's work is consistent. I shall argue, however, that their proposed solutions prove unsatisfactory with respect to Frege's view of logic and especially his logicism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.61073 |
| Date | January 1991 |
| Creators | Friend, Michèle |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Arts (Department of Philosophy.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001274914, proquestno: AAIMM74671, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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