In this paper, I discuss the connection between happiness and reason in the work of Herder, Kant, and Hegel. First, I consider Herder’s integration of satisfaction and rationality and Kant’s complete separation of rational imperatives from particular experience. I discuss (and partially endorse) Kant’s critique of Herder as arbitrary and overly reliant on analogy. I then turn to Hegel’s response to this debate. I argue that Hegel’s Phenomenology provides an integration of happiness (in the broad, Aristotelian sense) and reason that is not subject to the same pitfalls as Herder’s solution. I examine two examples of rational critique in the Phenomenology and conclude with brief remarks about happiness and the rational society in Hegel’s work.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:scholarworks.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1162 |
Date | 15 May 2015 |
Creators | Monetti, Carson |
Publisher | ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University |
Source Sets | Georgia State University |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Philosophy Theses |
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