Based on three essays, this Ph.D. thesis studies costly and truthful communication in the following situation: a sender (S) tries to convince a receiver (R) to accept a project.<p>Before communication, both agents do not know the project quality. On the one hand, they believe with probability α that the project is of high quality and will raise R’s payoff by r_H, and otherwise that it is of low quality and will decrease R’s payoff by / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ulb.ac.be/oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209351 |
| Date | 20 January 2014 |
| Creators | Body, Olivier |
| Contributors | Kirchsteiger, Georg, Gassner, Marjorie, Potters, Jan, Dewatripont, Mathias, Cantillon, Estelle, Alos-Ferrer, Carlos |
| Publisher | Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Bruxelles |
| Source Sets | Université libre de Bruxelles |
| Language | French |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/openurl/vlink-dissertation |
| Format | 1 v. (x, 137 p.), No full-text files |
Page generated in 0.0016 seconds