In an interval society, voters are represented by intervals on the real line, corresponding to their approval sets on a linear political spectrum. I imagine the society to be a representative democracy, and ask how to choose members of the society as representatives. Following work in mathematical psychology by Coombs and others, I develop a measure of the compatibility (political similarity) of two voters. I use this measure to determine the popularity of each voter as a candidate. I then establish local “agreeability” conditions and attempt to find a lower bound for the popularity of the best candidate. Other results about certain special societies are also obtained
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:hmc_theses-1044 |
| Date | 01 April 2013 |
| Creators | Carlson, Rosalie J |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | HMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2013 Rosalie J. Carlson |
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